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Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June, 1996, Massachusetts Governor William Weld
signed a law' that prohibits Massachusetts from contracting
with companies that do business with the nation of Burma.
Massachusetts adopted the law to protest the Burmese re-
gime's oppression of human rights, including restrictions on
Nobel Peace Prizewinner Aung San Suu Kyi's political activ-
ity.2 Known as a "selective purchasing" or "selective pro-
curement" statute, the Massachusetts law took effect on
January 1, 1997. In June 1998, a consortium of more than
580 businesses filed suit against the state, seeking to have
the law declared unconstitutional.3 On November 4, 1998,
* Lynn Loschin is a graduate of the University of California, Santa Bar-
bara, and the University of California, Davis, School of Law, and an associate at
Rutan & Tucker, LLP, in Costa Mesa, California. Jennifer Anderson is a
graduate of the California State University, Chico, and a member of the class of
1999, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Ms. Loschin would
like to thank Professor Michael Glennon of U.C. Davis School of Law and Pro-
fessor Robert Stumberg of Georgetown University Law Center for their assis-
tance.
1. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (West Supp. 1997).
2. See A State's Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, THE ECONOMIST,
Feb. 8, 1997, at 33 (quoting Governor Weld at bill-signing that "[we hope] other
states and the Congress will follow our example and make a stand for the cause
of freedom").
3. See Tiffany Danitz, Boycott of Burma Leads to Litigation, WASHINGTON
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the District Court of Massachusetts held that the law uncon-
stitutionally usurps the federal government's exclusive
authority over foreign affairs.4 Massachusetts plans to ap-
peal the District Court's ruling to the First Circuit.5
Although scholars addressed the constitutionality of se-
lective purchasing laws in the context of the South African
divestment movement of the 1980s,' the legal issues are
worth revisiting. While many other countries had taken
stronger measures against South Africa than those taken by
the United States,7 many foreign countries and corporations
continue to do business with the Burmese dictatorship.! The
Massachusetts law has also sparked protests from the Euro-
pean Union and Japan, asserting that the law violates the
United States' international trade obligations.9 Since 1995,
TIMES, June 29, 1998, at 31.
4. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, No. 97-12042 (D. Mass.
Nov. 4, 1998).
5. See Leslie Gevirtz, Massachusetts to Appeal Ruling on Burma Trade
Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 11, 1998, at C5.
6. See, e.g., Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing Business in South Africa:
The Lifting of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and the Continu-
ing Validity of State and Local Anti-Apartheid Legislation, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 7
(1990); Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activ-
ism and the Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465 (1997); Valerie Ann Zondorak,
A New Face in Corporate Environmental Responsibility: The Valdez Principles,
18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 457 (1991).
7. See, e.g., European Community Approves Sanctions on South Africa,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1985, at 15.
8. See Australia Decides Against Anti-Burma Sanctions, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, [AGENCE FR.-PRESSE] Apr. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2101705
(discussing Australia's decision not to join the United States in imposing eco-
nomic sanctions on Burma); Katherine Butler, EU Tries to Scrap Burma Sanc-
tions, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL
16755007 (explaining that the European Union was "going to court on behalf of
multinational companies and banks who want to continue trading with the
military regime in Burma.").
9. See Leslie Gevirtz, Congressmen Defend Massachusetts to EU, Japan,
REUTERS EUROPEAN BUS. REP., Feb. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Reueub File; Michael Grunwald, Massachusetts Law Targeting Burmese
Junta Could Spark Trade War with Japan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1997, at
Al. The EU and Japan charge that the Massachusetts law violates the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement adopted as part of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See Agreement on Government Procurement,
Apr. 15, 1994, Final Texts of the Uruguay Round Agreements Including the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter Agreement
on Government Procurement], Annex 4(b), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Gatt File. Whether the Massachusetts law violates GATT is beyond the scope
of this paper, but generally, the agreement calls for national treatment and
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more than a dozen municipalities have passed similar laws."°
Furthermore, Burma may only be the tip of the iceberg, as
states and municipalities consider selective purchasing laws
aimed at other nations."
This paper explores the constitutionality of the Massa-
chusetts law and similar state and local legislation. Part II
provides some background information on the political and
economic situation in Burma, and compares the economic
sanction movement with the South Africa divestiture move-
ment of the 1980s. Part III discusses the state of the law and
analyzes the constitutionality of selective purchasing laws.
This section concludes that such laws are not preempted by
federal law and violate neither the dormant commerce clause
nor the federal government's exclusive power to conduct for-
eign affairs. Finally, the article provides some policy consid-
erations that support upholding the constitutionality of selec-
tive purchasing laws.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRADE
Burma is only the most recent country to experience a
nexus between its domestic political situation and its inter-
national trading position. In the past, both individual coun-
tries and the United Nations have used trade leverage to at-
tempt to influence a nation's domestic human rights
practices. 2 Whether trade sanctions actually lead to change
non-discrimination. However, Article XXIII, section 2 creates an exception to
the Government Procurement Agreement if the restriction is "necessary to pro-
tect public morals, order or safety ... human ... life" or relates to "prison la-
bour." Id. at Art. XXIII. Arguably, the selective purchasing laws might fit into
this exception, especially if the proponents can offer proof that slave labor is
used in Burma. Further, the agreement entered into force on January 1, 1996.
Query the status of the municipal ordinances adopted prior to that date. See
id. at Art. XXIV, § 1.
10. See Grunwald, supra note 9. Cites that have passed selective purchas-
ing laws include San Francisco, Berkeley, Oakland, and Santa Monica, Califor-
nia; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; Takoma Park, Maryland; and
Carbarro, North Carolina. See Mary George, Boulder May Aim Boycott at My-
anmar, DENVER POST, Dec. 3, 1996, at B2.
11. Massachusetts was considering a selective purchasing law aimed at In-
donesia when the legislature adjourned for the year. See H.B. 4575 (Mass.
1997). See also Grunwald, supra note 9 (suggesting that introduction of Indo-
nesia bill sparked protest from Japan); A State's Foreign Policy: The Mass that
Roared, supra note 2, at 33 (stating that Indonesia bill may be real reason that
Europe and Japan "went ballistic").
12. See Michael J. Reppas, The Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention, 9
1999] 375
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in these practices is a subject best left for political scientists,
but the sanctions themselves affect international business
practices, including where and with whom companies may do
business.'
3
A. Burma's Political Situation
In 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for De-
mocracy led students and monks in nonviolent street protests
against Burma's military regime.14 The military killed 10,000
people in the streets and detained countless others.15 Suu
Kyi was placed under house arrest.'6 Her party won national
elections in 1989, but the military government (reconstituted
under the ominous acronym SLORC: the State Law and Or-
der Restoration Council) refused to honor the results.' 7 Al-
though Suu Kyi was technically "released" from house arrest
in 1995, she is not free to move around the country, and any-
one who associates with Suu Kyi risks detention. 8
Burma's human rights record is appalling. 9 Yearly re-
ports by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 463, 475 (1989) (reviewing economic sanctions imposed on
Haiti by the United Nations); W. Gary Vause, Tibet to Tienanmen: Chinese
Human Rights and the United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1575,
1576 (1989) (recognizing trade leverage measures imposed on China by the
United States, Japan, and Western European countries).
13. See, e.g., European Community Approves Sanctions on South Africa, su-
pra note 7 (discussing European sanctions on South Africa which restricted new
investment and banned oil exports and the exchange of certain technologies).
14. See id. In contrast to the Tiananmen Square uprising in China, the
Burmese democracy movement had little foreign news coverage.
15. See Brad Miller, Burma in Chains: U.S. Companies Profit from Slavery,
THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1995, at 32, available in LEXIS, News Library, AsapII
File.
16. See John Pilger, In a Land of Fear, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 4, 1996,
at T12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Guardn File. Aung San Suu Kyi's
father, Aung San, was a revered hero in Burma. He led an uprising against the
Japanese during World War II, and after the war negotiated Burma's inde-
pendence from Britain. See id. He was assassinated in 1947. See id.
17. See id. The National League for Democracy won 82% of the seats in
Parliament. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, BURMA REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996 (1997) <http:
//www.state.gov/www/globalhuman-rights/1996_hrp-report/burma.html>.
18. See Pilger, supra note 16.
19. See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, supra
note 17 (noting that "Burma continues to be ruled by a highly authoritarian
military regime condemned for its serious human rights abuses"); AMNESTY




Amnesty International, and other groups continue to con-
demn SLORC for the use of torture, disappearances, and
forced labor.20 However, SLORC has made a continuing effort
to seek foreign investment to strengthen Burma's economy."
Since SLORC's takeover in 1988, foreign oil companies alone
have provided $400 to $500 million to the military regime.22
One of the most significant projects is a natural gas pipeline
funded in part by Unocal.23 Critics charge that slave labor is
being used to build the pipeline and other infrastructure
projects.24 Further, the army has burned villages to accom-
modate the pipeline, creating thousands of refugees. 5
Humanitarian organizations have publicized the con-
tinuing human rights atrocities and environmental destruc-
tion in Burma, to considerable effect. In 1995, Berkeley,
California became the first city to pass a selective purchasing
ordinance, and several other municipalities adopted similar
laws.26 Either due to economic or public relations considera-
tions, several large companies, including Levi-Strauss, sub-
sequently halted operations in Burma.27 After Massachusetts
adopted its selective purchasing law, Eastman-Kodak, Walt
Disney, Apple Computer, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, and
Pepsi followed suit.28 Currently, twenty-three cities have
20. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, supra note 17.
The continued repression and forced labor is creating a serious refugee prob-
lem. Thousands of Burmese fled to Bangladesh and Thailand. See id.
21. See Michael Christopher, Reflections on a Visit to Burma, 37 Asian Sur-
vey 540 (1997), available in 1997 WL 11023386.
22. See Pilger, supra note 16.
23. See As Administration Weighs Burma Sanctions, Unocal Inks New Gas
Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 31, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ap
File (noting that Unocal is largest American investor in Burma.)
24. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, supra note 17
(stating that the "[g]overnment restricts worker rights and uses forced labor");
Miller, supra note 15 (citing multiple incidences of forced labor).
25. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, supra note 17
(stating that military forces relocated hundreds of rural villages, especially in
ethnic minority areas).
26. See David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of
State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with
Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 180-82, n.22 (1997).
27. See Rights Group Says Total Backs Burma Junta, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, Oct. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File.
28. See Veronica Smith, Burma Boycott Movement Fells Biggest Prize Yet:
Pepsi, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Afp File. Evaluating the legislation's effect is difficult. The companies that
1999] 377
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laws prohibiting the municipal government from conducting
business with companies that do business in Burma.29 De-
spite selective purchasing laws and activist-led boycott ef-
forts, many foreign companies continue to do business with
SLORC.3 ° Cumulative foreign investment in Burma at the
end of 1996 exceeded five billion dollars.3 Fuji, one of Ja-
pan's largest banks, recently announced a joint venture with
Burma's Yoma Bank.32 Massachusetts' "no-trade" list in-
cludes such well-known names as Mitsubishi and Sony, both
of which continue to do business in Burma.33 Both American
and foreign companies involved in infrastructure projects
remain deeply entrenched in Burma.34
B. Divestment and South Africa
Burma's situation is somewhat comparable to South Af-
rica during the apartheid era. Like South Africa, Burma's in-
tractable government rules with an iron fist, keeping a
popular, charismatic leader imprisoned.35 As developing
choose to withdraw often cite the political instability of the region. See id.
Others may be influenced by internal concerns-Pepsi's involvement in Burma
had led to numerous shareholder resolutions demanding withdrawal. See id.
29. See Leslie Miller, Decision Striking Down Burma Law Could Have Wide
Impact, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ap
File. The cities include New York, San Francisco, and Portland, Oregon. See
id.
30. See Jim Lobe, Burma-U.S.: Pepsico's Pullout Leaves Focus on Oil Com-
panies, Inter Press Serv., Jan. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7073396.
31. See Foreign Investment in Myanmar Tops 5 Billion Dollars, ASIAN
ECON. NEWS, Jan. 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iaicnws File.
Two hundred and thirty three foreign companies from 21 countries did business
in Burma, mainly in oil and gas, manufacturing, real estate, and mining. See
id. The United States had the sixth highest level of investment at $244 million.
See id.
32. See Smith, supra note 28.
33. The next legal battle over a Burma selective purchasing law may well
involve Mitsubishi. San Francisco, which has a selective purchasing ordinance,
initially selected a subsidiary, Mitsubishi Heavy, as contractor on an airport
transportation system. The contract is now being challenged on several
grounds, including the parent company's involvement in Burma. See Ted Bar-
dacke, American Boycotts Starting to Bite, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 1997, at
6.
34. See As Administration Weighs Burma Sanctions, Unocal Inks New Gas
Deal, supra note 23 (noting that Unocal recently expanded their gas develop-
ment agreement with Burma).
35. See Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean, A Boycott for Burma-the South
Africa of the 90's, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 1996, at A23 (describing Aung San
Suu Kyi's lengthy detention).
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countries rich with natural resources and inexpensive labor,
both countries have been attractive to foreign investors and
both have been the targets of international boycott cam-
paigns.36
South Africa's apartheid regime was the target of many
state and municipal divestment campaigns. Divestment laws
required the jurisdiction to sell any financial interest in com-
panies with South African operations. 7 More than a dozen
states and seventy cities and counties enacted some form of
divestment law during the 1980s. 8 The campaign convinced
over 100 educational institutions to divest at least some
South Africa-related holdings, resulting in the sale of more
than $410 million in stock and other investments. 9
Despite the widespread state and local activity, the
South African divestment campaign did not produce much
new constitutional law. None of the municipal ordinances or
state laws were struck down as unconstitutional, 40 although
the laws produced a great deal of academic commentary.4'
36. See Foreign Investment in Myanmar Tops 5 Billion Dollars, supra note
31.
37. See generally Thomas A. Troyer et al., Divestment of South Africa In-
vestments: The Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable Institu-
tions, and Pension Funds, 74 GEO. L.J. 127 (1985) (providing an in-depth ex-
planation of South African divestment schemes).
38. See Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an
Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 820
(1986).
39. See id. at 816-17.
40. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md.
1989) (upholding a divestment ordinance enacted in the City of Baltimore).
41. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, Special Issue: The United States Constitu-
tion in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: Distribution of Constitutional
Authority: The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
821 (1989) (suggesting that divestment laws are constitutional); Howard N.
Fenton III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local For-
eign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 563 (1993)
(unconstitutional); Grace A. Jubinsky, Note, State and Municipal Governments
React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionality
of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 543 (1985) (constitutional);
Kevin Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Lo-
cal Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469 (1987) (constitutional); Andrea
L. McCardle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-Apartheid Meas-
ures: Infusing Democratic Values into Foreign Policymaking, 62 TEMP. L. REV.
813 (1989) (constitutional, and also implicating first amendment issues because
such laws effectuate citizens' expressive interests); Schmahmann & Finch, su-
pra note 26 (unconstitutional); Spiro, supra note 38 (unconstitutional).
3791999]
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Furthermore, selective purchasing laws were fairly rare in
the case of South Africa.42 Most of the laws called for direct
divestment by the local entity itself," rather than purchasing
restrictions. Additionally, beginning in 1985, the federal
government itself imposed restrictions on trade with South
Africa." To date, the federal government has not enacted
similar comprehensive federal sanctions against Burma."
Therefore, although Burma and South Africa are somewhat
analogous, the constitutionality of state and local selective
purchasing laws directed against Burma is worth considering
in light of the differences.
III. LEGAL GROUNDS FOR INVALIDATING STATE SELECTIVE
PURCHASING LAWS
To analyze the constitutionality of selective purchasing
laws, three separate, but related, doctrinal areas must be
considered. First, Congress may preempt a state law under
the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause." Even if Con-
gress does not preempt the state law, it may still be invalid if
it violates the dormant commerce clause. However, an excep-
tion known as the market participant doctrine may apply if
the state is participating in, rather than regulating, the mar-
ket. Finally, if neither preempted nor unconstitutional un-
der the dormant commerce clause, the state law is nonethe-
less invalid if it intrudes upon the federal government's
ability to conduct foreign policy. 8 Even though these doc-
42. See Spiro, supra note 38, at 821 (noting that procurement restrictions
were considered "a new wrinkle" in the divestment legislation in 1986).
43. See generally Troyer, supra note 37 (discussing divestment schemes
affecting South Africa).
44. See Exec. Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1985).
45. See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 13,047 (1997). New investments in
Burma are limited to activities undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the
Government of Burma, or a non-governmental entity in Burma, entered into on
or after the effective date of the order. Id. at 4(d). See also Gevirtz, supra note
5; Warren P. Strobel & Tiffany Danitz, No Sanctions for Burma, Even as Rights
Woes Worsen, WASHINGTON TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at A2 (noting that Clinton ad-
ministration had previously decided not to impose sanctions); infra notes 48-60
and accompanying text (discussing federal preemption).
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
47. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 11.9 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining the market participant doc-
trine).
48. See id at § 18.12 (recognizing that States cannot "intrude into the for-
380 [Vol. 39
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trinal areas overlap somewhat, they have developed separate
bodies of case law and are worth considering individually.
A. Preemption
1. Congress May Expressly or Impliedly Preempt State
Law
The Supremacy Clause49 goes further than simply invali-
dating state laws that directly contradict federal law.
McCulloch v. Maryland" established that any state law that
conflicts with federal law is invalid under the Constitution.
However, the scope of the Supremacy Clause extends beyond
state laws which directly conflict with federal law. A state
law is also invalid if it conflicts with the purpose of federal
law, or if Congress has enacted such a comprehensive scheme
as to "occupy the field" in a particular area."
Preemption may be either express or implied. If Con-
gress expressly preempts state law in the text of the federal
statute, the only question for courts to decide is the scope of
the preemption.52 One issue that arises fairly often is
whether federal substantive law prevents a state from pro-
viding a state law remedy against the violator of the federal
law.53 The court must then engage in a statutory construc-
eign relations interests of the United States").
49. "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... and all Trea-
ties made.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land ...." U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2. In addition to acts of Congress, rules established by federal regulatory
agencies pursuant to authorizing legislation preempt state law to the same ex-
tent as the federal statutes themselves. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57
(1988). Treaties, executive agreements, and judge-made law may also preempt
state law. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 157-58
(2d ed. 1996).
50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
51. Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)
(explaining the concept of complete preemption) with Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F.
Supp. 113, 117 (D. Md. 1996) (discussing conflict preemption).
52. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 9.1 (explaining that courts
.must consider the federal law and its operation compared with the state stat-
ute and its operation").
53. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (holding that Medical
Devices Amendments did not preempt state law tort claim for negligent de-
sign); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (holding that plaintiff
could recover under state law for violation of federal safety standards for nu-
clear reactors). Of course, if Congress provided an exclusive remedy, state law
claims would be impermissible.
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tion exercise to determine Congress's intent." If Congress in-
tended only to establish a uniform federal standard, then
state law remedies will not be preempted.55
If the federal statute is silent, the task of determining
whether the state law is impliedly preempted is more diffi-
cult. The court must not only decide the scope of preemption,
but whether Congress intended to preempt state law in the
first place. 6 Courts begin with a presumption that federal
law does not preempt state law, especially in areas histori-
cally regulated by the states. 7 When analyzing Congress's
intent, the court can look to one of the several species of im-
plied preemption that have been articulated over the years."
First, if the state law actually conflicts with federal law, the
state law is preempted.59 The court will find an actual con-
flict if compliance with both state and federal law is physi-
cally impossible, ° or if state law stands as an obstacle to im-
plementing the goals of the federal legislation.6 Second,
federal law is preemptory where it regulates so comprehen-
sively that it "occupies the field," leaving no room for states
to supplement the federal scheme."
One important implied preemption case specifically deals
with an issue touching foreign affairs. In Hines v. Davido-
54. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding
that the Court's primary task was to examine statute's preemption provision).
55. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 238.
56. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 9.4 (explaining that when
Congress has been silent on the issue of preemption, state law is only pre-
empted to the extent of its conflict with federal law).
57. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978);
New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
58. The Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504, created some
confusion among lower courts. Some courts believed that if a statute contained
a preemption clause, only an express preemption analysis was appropriate.
The Supreme Court clarified this in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280
(1995), stating that an express preemption clause supports an inference that
Congress did not intend to preempt matters outside the clause's scope. How-
ever, the mere existence of a preemption clause does not foreclose an implied
preemption analysis.
59. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
60. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1962).
61. See Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
62. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
382 [Vol. 39
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vitz, 63 the United States Supreme Court considered whether
federal law preempted Pennsylvania's Alien Registration
statute. The Court held that regulating immigration and as-
sociated matters was specifically delegated to the federal
government.64 Furthermore, Congress had adopted a com-
prehensive scheme to register aliens.65 Therefore, the states
could not adopt either inconsistent or supplementary laws
beyond what Congress had already enacted.6 Even if a sup-
plementary law was not inconsistent with the federal statute,
the state law stood as an obstacle to Congress's objective in
enacting a comprehensive, national scheme.
The Court stated that no single method conclusively de-
termines whether or not Congress intended to enact a com-
prehensive scheme that preempted further state regulation."S
However, the Court did note that because the legislation im-
plicated foreign affairs, "concurrent state power that may
exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits."69 Thus, the
Court's holding suggests that it may be easier to find that
Congress intended to preempt state law when foreign affairs
are at issue."
2. The Federal Government Has Not Preempted Selective
Purchasing Laws
The federal government has not preempted state or local
governments from enacting selective purchasing laws di-
rected at Burma. Federal law has not expressly preempted
state action, no actual conflict between state and federal law
exists, and the federal government has not regulated so com-
63. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
64. See id. at 62.
65. See id. at 66.
66. See id. at 66-67.
67. See id.
68. See Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Court suggested
some factors to consider in a preemption analysis: the nature of the power ex-
erted by Congress, the policy purpose Congress sought to attain, and the char-
acter of the obligations imposed by the law. See id. at 70.
69. See id. at 68.
70. However, if a state adopts a law that expressly supports federal immi-
gration policy, it may not be preempted. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976). Federal law prohibited hiring certain aliens, and California adopted
federal standards and imposed criminal sanctions on employers who hired ali-
ens within the class prohibited by federal law. Thus, a state law that imple-
ments the policies adopted by the federal government may be permissible.
1999]
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pletely as to occupy the field.
To determine whether Congress has expressly preempted
state law, a reviewing court must first look to see whether
any relevant legislation contains a preemption clause." The
most specific legislation that might contain preemptive lan-
guage is the Cohen-Feinstein amendment to the 1997 foreign
operations appropriations bill.7 ' This amendment authorizes
the President to prohibit new investment in Burma if he cer-
tifies to Congress that the Burmese government has commit-
ted "large-scale repression of or violence against the demo-
cratic opposition."73 Additionally, the bill prohibits most
bilateral foreign aid to Burma and calls for the President to
develop a multilateral strategy to promote democracy and
human rights in Burma.74 However, it contains no preemp-
tion clause, nor any provision that might fairly be read as a
preemption clause.7
71. NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 9.1.
72. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996). This was a watered-down version of a much stronger sanctions bill
proposed by Senator McConnell. The McConnell proposal would have virtually
banned new investment in Burma by U.S. companies. Senator McConnell has
been attempting to pass sanctions against Burma for several years. See, e.g.,
Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1995, S. 1511, 104th Cong. (1995); Free
Burma Act of 1995, S. 1092, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S14092 (daily
ed. Sept. 21, 1995) (text of McConnell amendment to foreign appropriations
act). Comprehensive sanctions legislation has also been considered by the
House. See, e.g., Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1995, H.R. 2892, 104th
Cong. (1996) (introduced by Rep. Rohrbacher).
73. Omnibus Appropriations Act § 570 (b). President Clinton put some
sanctions into effect in May 1997, banning new American investment in Burma.
Companies already doing business in Burma were permitted to continue. See
Gevirtz, supra note 5.
74. See id. §§ 570 (a)(1), 570 (c). It has been suggested that the Massachu-
setts enactment is preempted by federal law simply because the Senate consid-
ered and rejected a similar federal proposal. Schmahmann & Finch, supra note
26, at 189. However, as discussed below, where Congress has chosen to remain
silent on a particular issue, the appropriate analysis falls within the dormant
commerce clause. It cannot fairly be asserted that Congress preempts state law
every time it considers and rejects a course of action similar to one chosen by a
state.
75. The District Court in Massachusetts agreed that no actual conflict ex-
ists between the Omnibus Appropriations Act and the Massachusetts selective
purchasing law. The court noted that to establish preemption, Congress must
intend to exercise its authority to preempt state law. No such intent was pres-
ent. Moreover, no actual conflict existed between the Massachusetts law and
the Appropriations Act. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, No. 97-
12042, slip op. at 6 (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 1998).
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The other possible federal statute that might preempt
state law in this area is the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act,76 the statute enacting the most recent round of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations
into U.S. law. One GATT agreement specifically addresses
government procurement issues.77 However, the statute itself
contains what might be called a "nonpreemption clause," spe-
cifically stating that no state law may be declared invalid be-
cause it violates the Uruguay Round.7 ' The only exception is
79
a lawsuit by the federal government itself for that purpose.
Further, the Clinton administration's statement to Congress
regarding its interpretation of GATT specifically stated that
Uruguay Round agreements do not automatically preempt
state law, even if an international dispute panel found a state
law inconsistent with GATT.80 The Act states that should a
problem arise, the federal government will use consultative
procedures to resolve the problem with the cooperation of
state authorities.81 Given this statutory language and evi-
dence of intent, it would be extremely difficult for a court to
find express preemption.
Thus, neither the Cohen-Feinstein amendment nor the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act expressly preempt state
laws dealing with either sanctions against Burma or govern-
ment procurement generally. Similarly, neither federal law
actually conflicts with selective purchasing laws.82 The laws
might even be viewed as actively supporting the policies im-
plicit in Cohen-Feinstein, such as preventing American tax
dollars from supporting the repressive Burmese regime."
76. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4817 (1994).
77. See Agreement on Government Procurement, April 15, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Gatt File.
78. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 102 (b)(2)(A).
79. See id.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 103-826, at 670 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4050.
81. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 102(b)(1)(C).
82. See supra note 75 (noting that no actual conflict existed between the
Cohen-Feinstein Amendment and the Massachusetts law).
83. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(a)(1),
110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The Cohen-Feinstein amendment specifically limits bi-
lateral U.S. aid to Burma to humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance, im-
plying that its drafters intended to keep American tax dollars from supporting
the regime's repressive measures or otherwise enriching the Burmese govern-
ment.
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Therefore, the laws are only preempted if the federal gov-
ernment has "occupied the field."
Determining whether the federal government has
"occupied the field" in this area depends on how broadly one
defines the field. If the field is broadly defined as "foreign af-
fairs," then the answer is probably yes. If the field is "state
procurement practices" the answer is probably no. Analogy
to the South African divestment movement suggests that the
narrower interpretation is probably the correct one. In Board
of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore,4 the Maryland Court of
Appeals rejected the contention that the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 19865 preempted Baltimore's divest-
ment ordinance. Despite the comprehensiveness of the fed-
eral law's sanctions, the court noted that preemption was not
lightly presumed, especially in areas traditionally regulated
by state and local governments; investing public funds was
clearly such an area.86 Thus, Board of Trustees suggests that
the relevant "field" Congress must occupy to preempt state or
local law is not foreign affairs, but local investment practices,
and by analogy, procurement practices. Clearly, neither the
Cohen-Feinstein amendment nor the Uruguay Round Imple-
mentation Act can be given such a broad reading. Because
Congress has not preempted states or localities from acting
in this area, the Supremacy Clause does not invalidate selec-
tive purchasing laws.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
1. State Regulations Cannot Impermissibly Interfere
with Interstate Commerce
Preemption analysis addresses whether a federal regula-
tory scheme preempts state law from regulating the same or
similar issues. By contrast, the dormant commerce clause
comes into play only when Congress is silent.87 The Constitu-
84. 562 A.2d 720, 740 (1989).
85. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).
86. See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 741 (1989).
87. See Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of
Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 571, 634, n.2 (1997) (discussing the fact that the dormant commerce




tion grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states ... ,88 How-
ever, the number of subjects that can touch interstate com-
merce are so numerous that Congress cannot regulate all of
them. In some areas, Congress will not regulate at all, either
by omission or by design. Thus, while preemption analysis
concerns itself with whether Congress intended to override
the states, the dormant commerce clause examines whether a
state's law is permissible in the face of congressional si-
lence.89 In short, if a federal statute on point exists, then
preemption analysis is appropriate; if Congress is silent, the
appropriate inquiry is whether the statute violates the dor-
mant commerce clause.
The history of the dormant commerce clause has been
marked by several changes in theory and law. The overrid-
ing theme in dormant commerce clause cases is the search for
a balance between the need for uniform, nondiscriminatory
law on the one hand, and the legitimate need for local regula-
tion on the other.9 ° The modern dormant commerce clause
analysis, established in Pike v. Bruce Church," requires that
the law regulate evenhandedly to effect a legitimate local
purpose.92 If both of these requirements are met, the re-
viewing court must balance the nature of the local interest
involved against the effect on interstate commerce and ask
whether the state law is the least restrictive means of ef-
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
89. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 9.3 (comparing the
preemption doctrine with commerce clause jurisprudence).
90. In this vein, the purpose of the dormant commerce clause has been lik-
ened to the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause; i.e., the former shields
"interstate commerce" from discrimination by the states while the latter pre-
vents individuals from being discriminated against by the states. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 8.1, n.5.
91. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
92. See id. at 142. In Pike, the Court invalidated an Arizona statute that
required certain Arizona produce to be packaged in the state. To comply with
the statute, certain growers would be required to construct costly packing fa-
cilities within state borders. In performing its dormant commerce clause
analysis, the Court said "[t]he State's tenuous interest in having the company's
cantaloupes identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify
the requirement that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000
packing plant in the state." Id. at 145. See also HENKIN, supra note 49, at 160
(suggesting that the Pike analysis applies to foreign as well as interstate com-
merce).
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fecting that interest.93 Merely incidental effects are permis-
sible, while laws that significantly hinder interstate com-
merce are not.94 Some commentators suggest that when a
state regulation effects foreign commerce, it should be subject
to a more rigorous dormant commerce clause analysis. 95 In
the preemption case Hines v. Davidovitz,96 the Court stated
that when it comes to foreign affairs, a state's power to leg-
islate is at its lowest ebb.97 Thus, courts are more willing to
find that Congress has preempted a state law when the law
touches upon foreign affairs. Because a state's power to leg-
islate on foreign affairs is minimal, its power to affect foreign
commerce should also be minimal when Congress is silent.99
The Supreme Court addressed the dormant commerce
clause in a case directly dealing with foreign trade. In Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,99 the Supreme Court in-
validated California's imposition of property taxes on Japa-
nese cargo containers. Generally, states may tax vessels en-
gaged in both interstate and foreign commerce when the tax
is nondiscriminatory, evenly apportioned, and has some rela-
tion to services that the state provides. 00 However, because
the vessels were engaged in foreign commerce, two additional
factors came into play.
First, the Court was clearly concerned with the risk of
double taxation, which offends the Commerce Clause. 0' To
remove this risk in interstate commerce, the Court created
the requirement that jurisdictions apportion taxes between
themselves, to ensure that no vessel is taxed more than
93. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
94. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 8.7.
95. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 161. See also Spiro, supra note 38 at 835
(citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), for this
proposition). However, the challenged tax in Japan Line was prohibited by a
multilateral treaty; further, the United States and Japan had a bilateral treaty
specifically designed to avoid double taxation on the type of containers at issue.
It seems that a simpler and more logical rationale would have been that the
state tax was preempted by the two treaties.
96. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
97. See id. at 68.
98. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 161 n. 52.
99. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
100. See id. at 444-45.
101. See id. at 446. The prospect of decreased profits as a result of double
taxation is an obvious disincentive to foreign commerce.
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once.1"' When one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign,
however, the U.S. government cannot act to ensure that ves-
sels are not doubly taxed. Vessels domiciled in foreign coun-
tries are, most likely, fully taxed in that nation. Therefore,
the Court held that the state tax exposed foreign, but not
domestic, commerce to double taxation, and the tax was thus
invalid.
1 13
Second, the Court held that state property taxes on the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce impaired federal uni-
formity in an area where uniformity is essential.' State
taxes on foreign commerce prevent the nation from "speaking
with one voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign governments."'' For example, state taxes may cause
international disputes over tax apportionment. 6 Further, if
state taxes create an imbalance in taxation, foreign nations
may retaliate against American instrumentalities in their ju-
risdictions.' 7 Retaliation would not be limited to the state
levying the tax, but would be felt nationwide.' 8
Although Japan Line is often cited for the "speaking with
one voice" proposition,'0 9 the Court's decision is specifically
focused on taxes. The Court applied a different test than the
traditional Pike v. Bruce Church"0 dormant commerce clause
analysis. This suggests that taxes are different than other
laws that may touch interstate or foreign commerce and that
special considerations of national uniformity restrict a state's
ability to tax instrumentalities of foreign commerce. There-
fore, although proponents of applying a more stringent dor-
mant commerce clause analysis to foreign trade often cite
Japan Line, the contours of any extra scrutiny outside the
tax context are unclear."'
102. See id. at 447.
103. See id. at 448.
104. See id.
105. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
106. See id. at 450.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 450-51.
109. See, e.g., Schamahmann & Finch, supra note 26, at 189-90, 192.
110. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
111. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 38, at 835. Professor Spiro cites Japan Line
for the proposition that "a more extensive constitutional inquiry" is required in
foreign dormant commerce clause cases. However, in Container Corp. v. Fran-
chise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983), the Court held that even when state
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2. Selective Purchasing Laws Do Not Pose an Undue
Burden on Foreign Commerce
Selective purchasing laws do not violate the dormant
commerce clause under the Pike v. Bruce Church".. analytic
framework. Selective purchasing laws meet all three of
Pike's criteria: 1) the laws regulate evenhandedly, 2) effect a
legitimate local interest, and 3) the effect on foreign com-
merce is merely incidental.
First, selective purchasing laws are nondiscriminatory
on their face. They do not favor local over foreign interests;
they simply prohibit the locality from doing business with
any company that fits into the law's criteria. Preventing dis-
crimination that favors local over out-of-state businesses is
one of the key functions of the dormant commerce clause. '3
Second, selective purchasing laws promote legitimate lo-
cal interests. On the most abstract level, every governmental
entity has the responsibility to protect basic human rights.
This concept was recognized by the Supreme Court when it
held that various "fundamental" provisions of the Bill of
Rights applied to the states."' Thus, local action to promote
human rights is a legitimate local interest. Specifically,
Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore"' recognized a local
government's right to invest city funds consistently with the
moral concerns of its citizens.- The Maryland Court of Ap-
peal, upholding the city's South Africa divestment ordinance,
acknowledged that disassociating the city from the "moral
taint" of apartheid was a legitimate local interest."6  The
same moral issues apply in the context of government pur-
legislation touches on foreign policy, the law runs afoul of the dormant com-
merce clause only if the law "implicates foreign policy issues which must be left
to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive." The second is-
sue must be dealt with in the preemption analysis, and the first should not im-
plicate selective purchasing laws, which are primarily concerned with regulat-
ing local procurement policies.
112. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
113. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 8.1, at 275. The rationale of
the commerce clause was to prevent the enactment of internal trade barriers
that could economically Balkanize the Union. Approval of a discriminatory
regulation by one state would only invite retaliatory legislation by burdened
jurisdictions. Thus, by enacting the commerce clause, the framers limited the
ability of the states to burden interstate commerce.
114. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 11.6, at 385-88.
115. 562 A.2d 720 (1989).




Third, while selective purchasing laws serve legitimate
local interests, they do not create an undue burden on inter-
state commerce. In Board of Trustees, the Maryland Court of
Appeal rejected the argument that divestment impermissibly
burdened interstate commerce under the Pike v. Bruce
Church"' balancing test. Analyzing the ordinance at hand,
and not the nationwide divestment trend,"8 Baltimore's di-
vestment had only an incidental effect on interstate com-
merce." 9  Logically, the same analysis applies to local pur-
chasing statutes. Compared to foreign commerce as a whole,
one state or local ordinance prohibiting purchases from a
relatively small number of companies would have little effect.
Furthermore, the Maryland court rejected the argument that
some companies may be particularly harmed; for example,
those who want to do business with both Burma and Massa-
chusetts. The court noted that the dormant commerce clause
is designed to protect the marketplace as a whole, not par-
ticular businesses.'
20
Finally, selective purchasing laws do not violate Japan
Line's suggestion that heightened scrutiny is required where
foreign commerce is implicated. In a subsequent case, Con-
tainer Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board,' the Supreme Court
clarified that not all state regulations relating to foreign pol-
icy violate the dormant commerce clause."'2 A law is only in-
117. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
118. But see Spiro, supra note 38, at 834-35 (suggesting that courts should
look at total effect of all similar laws to determine whether laws impermissibly
burden commerce).
119. See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 755 (1989).
The court applied the Pike test, first concluding that the divestment ordinances
effected the legitimate public interest of ensuring that pension funds are in-
vested in a socially responsible manner. Id. The court then determined that
"while we do not dispute that the Ordinances impose some burden on interstate
commerce, in our opinion that burden is not excessive in relation to the bene-
fits." Id.
120. See id.
121. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
122. See id. at 194. See also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512
U.S. 298 (1994) (holding the California system originally challenged in Con-
tainer Corp. permissible under the foreign commerce clause). The Court noted,
inter alia, that Congress had remained silent on the issue in the eleven years
since Container Corp. was decided. If Congress, the branch with the responsi-
bility for regulating foreign commerce, objected to California's system, they
could have acted to preempt it. See id. at 324.
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valid if it involves foreign policy issues, which must be re-
solved by the federal government, or if it violates a clear fed-
eral directive.' 3 If the latter applied, the selective purchas-
ing laws would be impliedly preempted. Thus, the only
question is whether selective purchasing laws involve a for-
eign policy issue that must be resolved by the federal gov-
ernment. No such issue is implicated; selective purchasing
laws do not reflect foreign policy, they merely regulate the
state's own purchasing practices. Similarly, the Maryland
court rejected the suggestion that apartheid was such an is-
sue in Board of Trustees."4
C. The Market Participant Doctrine
1. Development of the Doctrine
Even if a stronger version of the balancing test should be
applied to state laws that implicate foreign commerce, the
Supreme Court has carved out an exemption that should ap-
ply equally to interstate or foreign commerce. Known as the
market participant exemption, this doctrine exempts states
from the dormant commerce clause when they are acting as a
participant in, rather than a regulator of, the market.' The
Supreme Court first recognized the market participant ex-
ception in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.'2' Maryland had
established a complex program designed to reduce the num-
123. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 194. Justice
Scalia's view is that the "speak with one voice test" should be eliminated. See
Barclays Bank PLC, 512 U.S. at 331-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring with the judgment). Justice Scalia would only overturn laws on dor-
mant commerce clause grounds in two situations: when the law discriminates
on its face, or when the law is indistinguishable from a law previously held un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court. See id. See also Itel Containers Int'l
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
124. See Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 755 (Md.
1989). The court also considered the likelihood of retaliation, which the Su-
preme Court had stated as another reason behind the need for uniformity in
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 159. The Maryland court rejected this argument,
stating that the likelihood that South Africa might retaliate against divestment
was "remote." See Board of Trustees, 562 A.2d at 756-57. In light of the World
Trade Organization's control over such matters, retaliation seems even less re-
mote in a modern context.
125. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 8.4.
126. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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ber of "junked" vehicles in the state. Under the original law,
anyone in possession of an inoperable vehicle eight years or
older could transfer the vehicle to a licensed scrap operator,
who could then claim a "bounty" from the state for destroying
the vehicle.127 Neither the owner or the scrap operator were
required to provide documentation of title.'28 In 1974, the law
was amended to require title documentation.'29 However, the
requirements for Maryland scrap processors were less rigor-
ous than for out-of-state processors, and the out-of-state
processors challenged the law.'30 The Court held that while
under a traditional analysis the law would be subject to dor-
mant commerce clause attack, the dormant commerce
clause's limitations did not apply under these circum-
stances.' When the state moves from acting as a regulator
of the market to acting as a participant, the dormant com-
merce clause does not restrict the state's activity. 132
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine in two sub-
sequent cases. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake'33 upheld South Dakota's
policy of restricting the sale of cement from a state-owned
plant to residents.' Again, the Court distinguished between
the state's regulatory and participatory roles in the market.
The Court recognized "the right of a trader.., engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." 3'
127. See id. at 798-99.
128. See id. at 799.
129. See id. at 800-801.
130. See id. A Maryland scrap processor was only required to submit an
"indemnity agreement" in which a vehicle's supplier certifies his own right to
the vehicle and agrees to indemnify the processor for any third-party claims
arising from its destruction; non-Maryland processors were required to submit
formal documentation of title in order to claim the bounty. Id.
131. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804 (1976) (stating
that Maryland's action is not the kind that implicates dormant commerce
clause).
132. See id. at 809. By "bidding up" the price for scrapped vehicles through
its offer of a bounty, Maryland was participating in the market rather than
regulating it.
133. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
134. See id. at 446. A Wyoming concrete distributor, which had been a long
time customer of South Dakota's state-owned cement plant, was denied sup-
plies during a cement shortage because of the plant's policy of filling orders
from residents first. See id. at 432-33.
135. Id. at 438 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919)).
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In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Em-
ployers, Inc.," 6 the Court examined the constitutionality of
the mayor of Boston's executive order requiring that city-
funded construction projects employ a work force that in-
cludes at least fifty percent Boston residents.'37 The Court
disagreed with the conclusions of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, which held that the city was not a market
participant in the same sense that Maryland and South Da-
kota were in Alexandria Scrap and Reeves, respectively. 138
The Court held that when the city entered into a construction
contract, it was a market participant.'39 The Court further
noted that it was improper to examine the impact on local
firms employing out-of-state residents or other interstate im-
plications of the mayor's order.146 The only inquiry is whether
the state is a participant in the market; if so, the dormant
commerce clause analysis simply does not apply.'
The market participant exception may have been re-
stricted by the Supreme Court's decision in South-Central
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.' In Wunnicke,
Alaska adopted a statute authorizing the sale of timber from
state lands.' The statute also required successful timber
bidders to process the timber within the state.' The Court
disagreed with Alaska's argument that Congress had
authorized this provision.4 ' However, the Court was unable
to reach a majority decision on whether the in-state process-
136. 460 U.S. 204 (1980).
137. Of the three key market participant cases, the facts of White probably
present the clearest example of local protectionism. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, upheld the market participant ex-
ception on a 7-2 vote. Justices Blackmun and White concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. See id. at 215.
138. See id. at 214-15.
139. See id. The Court also rejected the argument that the market partici-
pant exception should not apply because some city projects were partly funded
by federal dollars. The Court noted that the regulations of the federal pro-
grams, which provided that local labor must be used to the maximum extent
possible, affirmatively sanctioned the Mayor's order. See id.
140. See id. at 209-10.
141. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204, 209-10 (1980).
142. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
143. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984).
144. See id. at 84 n.1.
145. See id. at 92-93.
394 [Vol. 39
SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAWS
ing provision violated the dormant commerce clause.
Justice White's plurality decision held that Alaska's law
violated the dormant commerce clause. 4 ' Justice White felt
that the market participant exception should not be permit-
ted to place post-sale restrictions on the commodity, in this
case, by requiring local processing.147 Such post-sale restric-
tions placed an unacceptable burden on interstate commerce
by going beyond the market in which the state was a partici-
pant-the timber-selling market.'48  Alaska's regulation in-
vaded an area where the state was not a participant-the
timber processing market' 49 -and placed unacceptable bur-
dens on interstate commerce."' The plurality held that the
"market," for purposes of the market participant exception,
must be narrowly defined.15' States are allowed to benefit lo-
cal residents, but cannot act to burden interstate commerce
through contract provisions that have a regulatory effect."
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor disagreed with the plu-
rality, stating that Alaska was acting as a market partici-
pant. '  Essentially, Alaska was offering the timber pur-
chaser a reduced price in return for hiring Alaska residents
to process the timber."4 Two Justices would have remanded
the case to the lower courts to first determine whether
Alaska was acting as a market participant."' If not, the
court would then apply the traditional dormant commerce
146. See id. at 100.
147. See id. at 95.
148. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97
(1984).
149. See id. at 98.
150. See id. at 101.
151. See id. at 97-98.
152. See id. at 98.
153. See id. at 102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 103
(1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
The contractual term at issue here no more transforms Alaska's sale of timber
into "regulation" of the processing industry than the resident-hiring preference
imposed by the city of Boston in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983), constituted regulation of the construction
industry. Alaska is merely paying the buyer of the timber indirectly, by means
of a reduced price, to hire Alaska residents to process the timber.
Id.
155. See id. at 101 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Marshall took no part in deciding Wunnicke. See id. at 101.
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clause analysis to the facts of the case. 116
The restrictions placed on the market participant doc-
trine after Wunnicke are unclear. Given the Supreme Court's
splintered ruling and the changes in Court personnel since
the decision, 5 ' how the Court would decide a similar case in
the future is unknown. However, even assuming the plural-
ity decision is the correct law, the exception still acts to ex-
empt states from dormant commerce clause restrictions when
they act as direct participants in a narrowly defined market.
2. The Market Participant Doctrine Renders Selective
Purchasing Laws Immune to Dormant Commerce
Clause Considerations
Unquestionably, when a government entity purchases
goods or services in the marketplace, it is acting as a market
participant, rather than a market regulator.158 Massachusetts
and the other localities that have adopted selective purchas-
ing ordinances do not purport to control the behavior of any
private entity. They simply reflect a policy decision that the
locality does not wish to transact business, as a market par-
ticipant, with those who support the government of Burma.
Any business that does not wish to do business with the lo-
cality is free to conduct business with Burma.'59 Because the
local governments are acting as market participants, the
dormant commerce clause's restrictions should not apply.
The policy concerns that led the Supreme Court to create the
exception apply to selective purchasing laws. The dormant
commerce clause helps to prevent state regulations and taxes
from impeding the free market 6 ° or unfairly favoring locals
over outsiders.'6' Selective purchasing laws do not implicate
156. See id.
157. Of the justices who decided Wunnicke, only Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor, and Justice Stevens remain on the Court. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor dissented strongly and would have applied the
market participant exception to Alaska's timber sales policy. See id. at 101-103.
158. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983) (holding that city was market participant when hiring contractors
to construct public buildings); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)
(holding that sales of cement from state-owned plant qualifies the state as a
market participant).
159. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
160. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-37.
161. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
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these concerns. The government is merely placed in the
same position as any other market participant: it is permit-
ted to choose with whom it will conduct business. Competi-
tion and the free market proceed unhindered.
Opponents of selective purchasing laws may argue that
the market participant doctrine should be limited, and ap-
plied only when the local government is acting to benefit its
own citizens.'62 However, this reading is far too narrow to ac-
commodate the Supreme Court's statement of the doctrine.
The Court has based the exception both on the purposes un-
derlying the dormant commerce clause and the traditional
right of traders to choose their trading partners."3 Addition-
ally, the Court has stated that fairness to local governments
supports the exception."' State proprietary activities are
burdened with the same restrictions placed on private trad-
ers and, therefore, they should enjoy the same benefits, in-
cluding the right to choose with whom to conduct business.'65
This broad language does not support the notion that the ex-
ception should only be permitted when local government acts
to benefit its citizens.
Furthermore, it would be an odd choice indeed to allow
local governments to discriminate, but not allow them not to
discriminate. Under such a twisted formula, Massachusetts
would be allowed to enact a selective purchasing law that re-
quires the state to purchase goods only from Massachusetts
companies, but it would not be allowed to enact a selective
purchasing law that reflects other valid concerns of state citi-
zens. This analysis suggests that state government's only
valid policy concern is favoring locals over outsiders; an idea
that the dormant commerce clause traditionally does not tol-
erate. 66
Opponents may also argue that the Wunnicke 6v doctrine
177, 189 (1938) (holding that states may not discriminate against outsiders un-
der guise of safety regulations).
162. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 26, at 192-94.
163. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39.
164. See id. (stating that because state proprietary activities must accept
same burdens as private participants, states should share same freedoms when
acting as market participants).
165. See id. at 439.
166. See supra note 113 (noting that preventing discrimination is a key con-
cern of the dormant commerce clause).
167. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
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applies, negating the market participant exception. 68 Wun-
nicke held that the market participant exception did not ap-
ply when a state placed post-sale restrictions upon a com-
modity it was selling; the restrictions moved the state's
action from the "participant" category to the "regulator" cate-
gory. 169 However, Wunnicke should not be given the broad
reading that would be required to bring selective purchasing
laws within its scope. While Alaska was attempting to
regulate conduct outside the market in which it was trad-
ing,"O selective purchasing laws only attempt to influence the
market in which the locality participates. The Supreme
Court distinguished between restrictions on private activity
outside the scope of the transaction and an "ongoing commer-
cial relationship" in which the locality "retained a continuing
proprietary interest in the subject of the contract." '71 Selec-
tive purchasing laws do not have a regulatory effect outside
the market in which the state or local government is partici-
pating and therefore do not offend Wunnicke.
Finally, opponents may argue that the market partici-
pant exception should not apply to foreign commerce.'72
While the Supreme Court has not had occasion to speak on
this issue,' 3 no principled reason exists for refusing to apply
(holding that post-sale restrictions on commodity sales negated market partici-
pant exception). See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text (discussing
Wunnicke decision).
168. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 26, at 194 (asserting that
local selective purchasing laws "restrict[] the post-purchase activity of the pur-
chaser, rather than merely the purchasing activity").
169. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97.
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a
state to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is
a participant, but allows it to go no further. The state may not impose
conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a
substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market.
Id. (emphasis added).
170. See supra note 142-152 and accompanying text. Alaska was arguably
attempting to influence the timber processing market, in which it was not a
participant.
171. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 99.
172. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 26, at 195-98 (rejecting the
proposition that selective purchasing laws are enacted to protect to local inter-
ests).
173. The Supreme Court in Reeves declined to comment on the constitution-
ality of "Buy American" statutes. Reeves, Inc, v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 n.12.
(1980). Compare K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977) (upholding Buy American law), with
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the market participant doctrine simply because foreign com-
merce may be implicated. Although the Court stated in Ja-
pan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles 74 that Commerce
Clause scrutiny may be more rigorous when foreign com-
merce is restrained, the concerns the Court expressed in that
case do not apply when the state is acting as a market par-
ticipant. Japan Line concerned a tax-a clear regulation of
foreign commerce. Selective purchasing laws do not regulate
what any other government or company may or may not do.
Nor do they prevent the United States from "speaking with
one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments." '  Selective purchasing laws regulate the
state's procurement policy, not commercial relations with
foreign governments.' 6
Additionally, if the Supreme Court should hold that the
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commrs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969) (striking down Buy American law). However, Bethlehem Steel predates
the Court's first application of the market participant doctrine in Hughes v. Al-
exandra Scrap Corp., 426 U.S 794 (1976). Discrimination against foreign com-
panies may now be prohibited under GATT's Government Procurement Agree-
ment.
174. 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979). A selective purchasing law, on its face, is nei-
ther a restraint or requirement placed on a foreign government (or business) in
the same manner as most favored nation status or import/export laws. Fur-
thermore, many trade-related activities conducted by states and municipalities
touch upon international relations. The California Trade and Commerce
Agency, for example, has offices in ten foreign countries. See Home Page of the
California Trade and Commerce Agency (visited Nov. 13, 1998)
<http://commerce.ca.gov./index.html>. One could certainly argue that Califor-
nia's independent activities prevent the United States from "speaking with one
voice." However, the counter-argument is that California only speaks for Cali-
fornia when it promotes the state as a desirable location for investment and
disseminates information about California's laws regulating business prac-
tices-just as Massachusetts only speaks for Massachusetts when it decides not
to do business with companies engaged in Burma.
175. See id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285
(1976)).
176. But see Spiro, supra note 38, at 839. Professor Spiro unfortunately
muddies the waters by mixing the market participant and dormant commerce
clause analyses. He suggests that South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984), stands for the proposition that the market par-
ticipant doctrine is limited if foreign commerce is involved. This is simply an
incorrect reading; the Court was analyzing the Alaska law under the Pike
framework after deciding that the doctrine did not apply. See id. at 99. The
two tests must be conducted separately. If the market participant doctrine ap-
plies, then the state's action is outside the scope of the Pike balancing test. The
Pike framework is only proper after rejecting the argument that the doctrine
applies at all.
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market participant doctrine does not apply if foreign com-
merce is implicated, it could well be the exception that swal-
lows the rule. In today's world, nearly any commercial deci-
sion could conceivably be related to foreign commerce in some
way. Suppose Canadian companies wanted some of the ce-
ment in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,'77 or some of the construction
contracts in White v. Mayor of Boston.'78 The market partici-
pant doctrine would have little substance left if any activity
that might touch foreign commerce is outside its scope. Fur-
thermore, refusing to apply the doctrine would do little to
further the key goal of the dormant commerce clause: pre-
venting unfair burdens on interstate commerce.'79 Thus,
when a state is acting as a market participant rather than
regulator, foreign commerce implications are irrelevant and
states should be allowed to take advantage of the doctrine.
D. Foreign Affairs Power
1. Federal Foreign Affairs Power as an Independent
Limit on State Action
Of the three doctrines one must analyze to determine the
constitutionality of selective purchasing laws, none is so
amorphous as the "foreign affairs power"-the federal gov-
ernment's exclusive right to conduct foreign affairs. 8 ° Thus,
even if the state law is not preempted, and even if it does not
violate the dormant commerce clause, it is still unconstitu-
tional if it runs afoul of the foreign affairs power. The analy-
sis is similar to the dormant commerce clause in that the
question of whether the state's action violates the federal for-
eign affairs power is only of concern when Congress is silent.
If the federal government has already acted to preempt the
state law, the state law is clearly invalid.''
The notion that the nation must speak with one voice in
foreign affairs dates back to the Constitution's framers.'82
177. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
178. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
179. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 47, § 8.1.
180. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 162 (noting that scope of foreign affairs
power is unclear).
181. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing express pre-
emption).
182. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
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The Constitution contains some explicit prohibitions on the
states. States may not enter into treaties or compacts with
foreign governments without Congress's consent.'83 Simi-
larly, duties on imports or exports must receive congressional
approval.' Finally, states cannot negotiate with foreign gov-
ernments on matters of foreign policy and are not permitted
to send ambassadors abroad.'8'
However, a significant body of law concerning matters
touching on foreign relations has traditionally been left to the
states.'86 In the normal course of business, states inevitably
affect the lives of foreign nationals, companies, and govern-
ments. States may use their long-arm statutes to assert ju-
risdiction over foreign nationals and companies."' State
courts may enforce foreign judgments and, in doing so, may
decide whether the judicial system that rendered the judg-
ment conforms to American due process standards. Finally,
state courts adjudicate many types of cases that might touch
on foreign policy or have some effect on diplomatic relations
between the United States and another nation.' Congress
has granted exclusive federal jurisdiction to only a small
number of the types of cases that may involve foreign gov-
ernments, officials, or nationals. 88
1961). "If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in re-
spect to other nations." Id.
183. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
184. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
185. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316
(1936).
186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1 cmt. b (1987).
187. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480
U.S. 102 (1987).
188. See State v. Willoughby, 892 P.2d 1319, 1330-34 (Ariz. 1995) (noting
jurisdictional issues regarding prosecution for murder that occurred in Mexico);
Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 702 P.2d 570, 575-76 (Cal. 1985) (discussing doctrine of
comity and applying Mexican law regarding land ownership to dispute). See
also Leigh M. Marjamaa, Mexico Fights to Protect Citizens in U.S. Prisons, THE
NEWS, June 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(discussing problems arising from death sentences imposed on Mexican nation-
als by Texas state courts); Kasky v. Nike Inc., No. 994446 (Cal. Ct. filed Apr. 20,
1998), available at <http://diana.law.yale.edu/diana/db/5798-1.html> (visited
Feb. 10, 1999) (bringing suit against Nike, Inc. for false representations about
their business practices in Southeast Asia).
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994). The federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over claims brought against foreign officials such as ambassadors. See id.
The federal courts also have exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought against
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In addition to some degree of latitude to act when Con-
gress is silent, Congress has also expressly delegated
authority to the states to implement national foreign policy
obligations in some areas. For example, states were left to
implement parts of the Uruguay Round of GATT and portions
of certain human rights treaties.19 ° Although federal law is
clearly supreme when Congress speaks on foreign policy,
these examples demonstrate that despite pronouncements
that the states have no voice at all in foreign affairs, the
situation is quite the opposite. States are permitted and
even encouraged to have a considerable impact on foreign
policy.
States may only encroach so far upon the federal foreign
relations power before the action becomes impermissible.
Until the late 1960s, the Commerce Clause was considered
the only source of "implied" limits on state interference in
foreign affairs.' However, in the 1968 decision Zschernig v.
Miller,9' the United States Supreme Court recognized an im-
plied limitation on state action outside the scope of the Com-
merce Clause. Zschernig involved an Oregon law that per-
mitted nonresident aliens to inherit from a state resident
only if the alien's country allowed U.S. citizens to inherit.19 3
Furthermore, the foreign beneficiaries had to have the right
to enjoy the property without the risk that their government
might confiscate the inheritance.' Holding that Oregon's
law intruded into a field constitutionally entrusted to the
president and Congress, the Court found the law invalid as
foreign states, see 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994), and foreign nationals for a tort that
constitutes a violation of a treaty or customary international law, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1994).
190. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4809 (1994). See also HENKIN, supra note 49, at 151; U.S. ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992).
191. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 162. However, federal courts had made
clear much earlier that when a conflict exists between a state and the federal
government in the area of foreign affairs, the federal law is supreme. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (stating that "power over exter-
nal affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government
exclusively"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (stating that
"in respect of foreign affairs generally, state lines disappear").
192. 389 U.S. 429, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 974 (1968).




applied.9 ' The Court held that the statute constituted an
undue intrusion into the realm of foreign relations.196 Thus, a
doctrine that has been the subject of comment, criticism, and
confusion-but no subsequent decisions by the Supreme
Court-was born.' 97
One fact about Zschernig that is often overlooked is that
the Court only held the Oregon law unconstitutional as ap-
plied.' 98 The Court declined to revisit a past decision, Clark
v. Allen,'99 which held that general reciprocity statutes were
not facially invalid."' The Zschernig court noted that state
courts are frequently required to read foreign laws.2"' De-
ciding whether another nation's laws granted reciprocal in-
heritance rights was not the problem. However, the state
courts applying the laws appeared to be engaging in value
judgments on the particular governments in question-
searching for a "democracy quotient," which actually ap-
peared to be a "noncommunist quotient."2"2 This kind of
search into a foreign government's administration and poli-
cies is speculative and has the potential to greatly embarrass
the United States.2 ' Furthermore, this type of involvement,
the Court held, crosses the line of permissible state involve-
ment in what was essentially a national matter.2 4 While
each individual inheritance case may only have an incidental
effect on foreign relations, as a whole, the law as applied had
a persistent, subtle effect.20'
Commentators have searched for Zschernig's meaning
since the case was decided. Some have tried to draw a dis-
tinction between state laws that "affect" foreign affairs as op-
posed to laws that "intrude."2 6 But perhaps the key feature
of Zschernig is that it only held the Oregon statute unconsti-
195. See id. at 432.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 49, at 162-65. See also sources cited supra
note 41 (offering varying interpretations of the foreign affairs power).
198. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
199. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
200. See Clark v. Allen, 503, 516-17 (1947).
201. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433.
202. See id. at 435.
203. See id. at 434-35.
204. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1968).
205. See id. at 440.
206. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 164.
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tutional as applied; the Court explicitly declined to overrule
Clark v. Allen."7 The Court's decision, full of quotations from
previous lower court rulings, seemed highly critical of pro-
bate judges who were willing to summarily discriminate
against Soviet client states."' It was not the state's laws that
were unconstitutional, but the way judges discriminatorily
applied them that created the potential international embar-
rassment."9 If this is the correct interpretation, then Zscher-
nig may lack the long-reaching restrictive effect for which it
is often cited.210 In upholding a California tax, the Court later
recognized that states may take actions that "merely have
foreign resonances," but do not interfere with foreign af-
fairs.21' Incorporating both doctrines, then, perhaps states
may act to "affect" foreign affairs, but judges must apply the
laws evenhandedly to avoid embarrassing the United States
internationally.
In any event, the Court has not had occasion to return to
Zschernig, and the contours of the doctrine the Court was at-
tempting to define are unclear. The simple fact that the
Court has not struck down any other laws on Zschernig
grounds suggests that the case has only a limited applica-t . 212
tion. As a general statement, Zschernig suggests that in
some cases, courts may invalidate state laws that impermis-
sibly intrude upon the federal government's ability to conduct
foreign relations, even when Congress has not spoken.
207. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
208. See id. at 437 n.8.
209. See Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Af-
fairs: State and Local Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 563,
588-89 (1993) (finding problems with the fact that the law at issue in Zschernig
required courts to exercise judgment over foreign nations).
210. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 26, at 198 (stating that the
Zschernig case "reflects the Court's distaste for local officials attempting to im-
print their particular reaction to an international matter in their local govern-
ance").
211. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
212. Professor Henkin suggests that Zschernig may have no future life; it
will merely become a relic of the cold war. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 165
n.2.
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2. Selective Purchasing Laws Do Not Intrude Upon the
Federal Government's Ability to Conduct Foreign
Policy
Selective purchasing laws do not implicate the same con-
cerns the Supreme Court expressed in Zschernig v. Miller,21
and should not be invalidated on those grounds. The district
court's decision that Massachusetts' law is unconstitutional
was based entirely on Zschernig."4 The case was therefore
incorrectly decided, and the First Circuit should reverse the
ruling on appeal.
The probate law overturned in Zschernig required judges
to make ad hoc decisions about foreign governments' policies
and credibility.2"5 This concern does not apply to selective
purchasing laws."6 The legislature, not the courts, makes a
single decision that it will not do business with certain com-
panies."' The courts are not required to make the same type
of continuous credibility decisions the Oregon statute re-
quired. Judges are not placed in a position to make difficult,
ad hoc judgments; nor can they embarrass the federal gov-
ernment with the type of statements the Court cited in
Zschernig.218
213. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
214. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, No. 97-12042, slip op. at 7 (D.
Mass. Nov. 4, 1998) (noting that given the court's ruling that the law violated
the foreign affairs power, the court need not rule on plaintiffs commerce clause
argument or Massachusetts' market participant defense).
215. Zeschernig, 389 U.S. at 435-36.
216. See Lewis, supra note 41, at 507 (arguing that South African divestment
laws do not implicate Zschernig's primary concerns).
217. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22 H, J (West Supp. 1997).
218. The Court offered myriad examples of inappropriate statements about
foreign governments that had appeared in state court judgments. The Court
noted:
Such attitudes are not confined to the Oregon courts. Representative
samples from other States would include statements in the New York
courts, such as "This court would consider sending money out of this
country and into Hungary tantamount to putting funds within the
grasp of the Communists," and "If this money were turned over to the
Russian authorities, it would be used to kill our boys and innocent
people in Southeast Asia ...." In Pennsylvania, a judge stated at the
trial of a case involving a Soviet claimant that "If you want to say that
I'm prejudiced, you can, because when it comes to Communism I'm a
bigoted anti-Communist." And another judge exclaimed, "I am not
going to send money to Russia where it can go into making bullets
which may one day be used against my son." A California judge, upon
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Courts should also avoid overturning selective purchas-
ing laws on Zschernig grounds as a policy matter, because
whether a state's action impermissibly interferes with foreign
policy is a question for the political branches to decide. Con-
gress and the executive branch actually conduct foreign rela-
tions and are better suited than the judiciary to determine
what intrudes upon foreign policy and what does not. There-
fore, the courts should only act to restrain an otherwise le-
gitimate exercise of state power in truly exceptional cases,
such as Zschernig, when a state's conduct has the clear po-
tential to cause embarrassment.
The District Court of Massachusetts held that the state's
selective purchasing law carried "a great potential for disrup-
tion or embarrassment."21 9 However, the only reason cited for
this "disruption" is that the European Union and Japan have
filed a complaint about the law with the World Trade Or-
ganization.22 ° The Massachusetts law therefore interferes
with the normal conduct of United States-European Union
relations.22" ' The court's opinion neglects to mention that the
Clinton Administration will defend the law before the World
Trade Organization.222 Given the federal government's deci-
sion to defend the law, it is unclear where the potential for
"disruption" or "embarrassment" arises. If the Massachu-
setts law contradicted established federal policy, such a po-
tential might exist. In this instance, however, the state and
federal policies are not in conflict. The district court purports
to examine the "substantive impact a state statute has on
foreign relations" and concludes that because the law was
"designed" to change Burma's domestic policies, the law is
being asked if he would hear argument on the law, replied, "No, I won't
send any money to Russia." The judge took "judicial notice that Russia
kicks the United States in the teeth all the time," and told counsel for
the Soviet claimant that "I would think your firm would feel it honor
bound to withdraw as representing the Russian government. No
American can make it too strong."
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437 n.8 (internal citations omitted). It is not difficult to
see how such inappropriate and inflammatory statements might cause the
Court to cringe with embarrassment for their judicial brethren.
219. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, No. 97-12042, slip op. at 4 (D.
Mass. Nov. 4, 1998).
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id.
222. See Gevirtz, supra note 5.
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unconstitutional.223 However, the court fails to identify that
substantive impact and merely concludes that because the
law intended to cause changes in Burma's policies, it uncon-
stitutionally intrudes on the federal government's foreign af-
fairs power. This reasoning does not address the concerns
raised by Zschernig and should not have been the basis for
holding the law unconstitutional.224
IV. CONCLUSION
During the debate over the constitutionality of South Af-
rica divestment legislation, several commentators suggested
that state and local divestment implicated the First Amend-
ment's values of free speech and expression.225 Selective pur-
chasing legislation furthers such values to an even greater
extent and is an important policy consideration behind up-
holding selective purchasing laws.
The founders of our government intended to create a par-
ticipatory democracy. Yet, two centuries later, many citizens
feel more disenfranchised and alienated than ever, and they
perceive that their ability to influence policy is nearly non-
existent.226 As we move into the twenty-first century, local
government may be the only arena in which citizens and
small groups can truly effect policy. Such participation is
crucial to the democratic process and should be encouraged
and supported whenever possible. For a small group of citi-
zens to be able to "send a message" to the government of
South Africa or Burma is critically important; such empow-
erment encourages future activism. This rationale is even
more acute when considering selective purchasing laws,
which govern how local tax money is spent.
When the impact on foreign policy is minor, and the risk
223. National Foreign Trade Council, No. 97-12042, slip op. at 6.
224. See supra notes 215-218 and accompanying text. See generally Lewis,
supra note 41, at 507 (arguing that South African divestment laws do not impli-
cate Zschernig's primary concerns).
225. See Bilder, supra note 41, at 829; McArdle, supra note 41, at 833.
226. Disillusionment can, of course, manifest itself in many different ways,
but an empirical method of tracking citizen interest and involvement is voter
turnout. According to the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate,
voter turnout in the 1998 election was at a fifty-six year low. See Press Release
from the Committee for the Study for the American Electorate, Turnout Dips to
56-Year Low (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http://tap.epn.org/csae/cgans4.html>.
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of retaliation is small or nonexistent, such considerations
should not be brushed away lightly. In an era when many
people perceive governmental influence as the exclusive
province of the wealthy, corporations, and political action
committees,227 it is particularly important to encourage grass-
roots involvement. Not only does such involvement fail to
harm the federal government, it actually helps by restoring a
measure of faith in a participatory, honest democracy.
Selective purchasing laws are legitimate exercises of
power by states or local governments, and courts should up-
hold their constitutionality. The federal government has not
preempted selective purchasing laws currently directed at
Burma. Furthermore, the market participant doctrine ex-
empts the laws from dormant commerce clause scrutiny,. 8
and even if the doctrine does not apply, the laws pass the
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test. 29 Finally, selective pur-
chasing laws do not interfere with the federal government's
ability to conduct foreign policy23° and are supported by
strong policy considerations.
In a time when most Americans feel increasingly alien-
ated and unable to effectively voice their concerns about fed-
eral policies, selective purchasing laws provide a means for
citizens to take concrete action at the local level. If the action
is clearly incompatible with federal policy, Congress should
preempt the state law. If it is not, as in the case of Burma,
Congress and the President should take advantage of local
initiatives to support and further federal policy.
227. See Center for Responsive Politics, The Big Picture: Where the Money
Came From in the 1996 Elections (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http://
www.crp.org/pubs/bigpicture/overview/bpoverview.htm>. The report notes that
40% of contributions for House of Representative candidates came from politi-
cal action committees, that the amount of soft money spent in 1996 tripled
compared to four years earlier, and that the largest source of campaign money
overall was the business community. Id.
228. See supra notes 158-179 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 112-124 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 213-224 and accompanying text.
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